MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TS Material from Deryabin Safe

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R	1133	REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C DATE: 19 June 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. N. Shepanek ~~MXX DXX XXXXX~~ SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6 Green~~				Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ________. Please respond as soon as possible. Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks, Rodge IC 7: CI Staff says they may be shown to Blakey. [initials]
2. ~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~OS Tube: FM~~				
3. ~~Mr. Young~~ ~~OSS Tube: BX2 Green~~				
4. ~~Mr. Dick Bovinger~~ ~~OSP~~				
5. ~~Donald Mandenholdt~~ ~~OP Tube: 1X2~~				
6. ~~Mr. Hubert Emery~~ ~~OL~~				
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source: SR/CI/K

Doc. No. XAAZ-17241

Doc. Date 20 APR 1964

Copy No. # Repro 2

Number of Pages 38

Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722

Date Document Received 15 JUN 1979

Logged By B

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REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Bigg	15 JUN 1979		15 JUN 1979				
RCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	Stanley 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1D15	B. Bigg	19 JUN 1979		19 JUN 1979				
Shipp–ch DDO/D	[illegible signature]	19 June 79		19 June 79				
AC/CI (ARCO)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Bigg	20 JUN 1979		20 JUN 1979				
RCI/OCC Breckinridge or Habilson	[illegible signature] 20 Jun 79							
DDO/TSCO								

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TO	
By (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE

When finished with these documents return them to DDO/TSCO as we are the control Office for these documents.

TS# 191722
TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP I) (40)

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LATEST VERSION

1927 to 1934 — Lived in Nikol

Fall 1934 — Entered "zero"

1935 to 1939 — Moved to Lenin... and then direct... then director c... cessively on Ul... Pr. Maksima Gor... (different ones

1938 — Father appointe... missar of Shipt... Commissar. Fam... at Ul. Serafim... year school No. Polyanka.

June 1941 — Completed 6th... with parents whe...

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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
Source	SR	CIA Control No.	191722A
Doc. No.	XAAZ-17241/1	Date Document Received	15 JUN 1978
Doc. Date	11 MAY 1964	Logged By	B
Copy No.	# Repro 2		
Number of Pages	28		
Number of Attachments			

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REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Sigg	15 JUN 1978		1? JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckenridge	Woodward Jane							
DDO/TSCO 10/15	B. Sigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Skeprent SA/DDO	[illegible] Smith	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
PK/CI/(n...)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Sigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckenridge	Geer Gabrielson							
DDO/TSCO								

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By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

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FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	
Source	SR/CI/K
Doc. No.	XAAZ-17241/2
Doc. Date	19 MAY 1964
Copy No.	#Repro 2
Number of Pages	22
Number of Attachments	

REGISTRY	
CIA Control No.	TS# 191722B
Date Document Received	15 JUN 1978
Logged By	B

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REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Twigg	15 JUN 1978			15 JUN 1978			
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	S. Koster 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1 HQ 65	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	M. Shepanek	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
ACICI (M.Cay)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Twigg	20 JUN 1978		21 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Gabrielson								
DDO/TSCO								

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By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP 1)

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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
Source	C/SR	CIA Control No.	TS# 191722C
Doc. No.	CSCI-3/781,491	Date Document Received	15 JUN 1970
Doc. Date	19 May 1964	Logged By	B
Copy No.	# Repro 2		
Number of Pages	2		
Number of Attachments			

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REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Bigg	15 JUN 1970		15 [illegible]				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	Messenger [illegible]							
DDO/TSCO 1D15	B. Bigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
SA/DO/O (Lopez)	M. Lepanie	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
DC/CI (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Bigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Halvorson								
DDO/TSCO								

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By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

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DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

14-00000

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	67

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

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EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seeon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

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EYES ONLY

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

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C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

14-00000

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

14-00000

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SECRET

Department of Justice
Washington 20530

October 20, 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

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downgrading and
declassification

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9 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET [illegible]

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There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn — 8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

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14-00000

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927		Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR	
Male	Divorced	Brown	Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches
Soviet	Caucasian	--	

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

AKA: Yuri NOSSENKO

DPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV).
1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGINA), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced.
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.

EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS: 1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR
1956 - Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of~~ operational interest ~~to this Agency. Therefore, it is~~ requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

IN CASE ADDRESS REPLY TO
AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

July 24, 1969

A13 724 817

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

C.N. 16 Jan. 1970

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downgrading and
declassification

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post 2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him. The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was agreeable. A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Folio

Wash Post 2/15/64

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12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~(phn)~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:

(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)

(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)

(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DD/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
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	ALTS
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(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

TOBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
SUPPLEMENTAL

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
	C/SRD
	C/S 3
✓	C/S3
	C/ID/
	[illegible]
	AATS

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District Field Office who are concerned with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

for
JOHN D. [illegible], Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

C\23---3\2.7

JUL 2 4 23 PM 64

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/[illegible] should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANAGOULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)

2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)

3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

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OLC 69-0675

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosekno case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D/Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY 1-9-72

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

---

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

SECRET EYES ONLY

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

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EYES ONLY

he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

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conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and

debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was

made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception

on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral

investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an

ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major

aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were

to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,

to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what

this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,

there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

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Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

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1 3 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET
~~EYES ONLY~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

already sanitized

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account .

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9 January 1975

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected~~ to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

EYES ONLY

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31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

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CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

SECRET
EYES ONLY

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

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31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
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REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

Прошение

Я, Носенко Юрий Иванович, прошу Правительство США предоставить мне политическое убежище в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Это решение мною принято в результате обдумывания этого вопроса в течение длительного [illegible]

Я абсолютно не верю в коммунистическую идеологию. Работая в КГБ и зная больше, чем рядовые советские люди, о внутренней политике, [illegible] Партии и [illegible] советского правительства, я убедился, что в СССР нет и не будет правды и настоящей свободы до тех пор пока руководит страной коммунистическая партия. Находясь в командировке в странах Запада, я имел возможность видеть [illegible] и действительно свободного мира. [illegible] в Венгрии и Восточной Германии, разгром демократического движения [illegible] армии [illegible] и [illegible] правительства [illegible] единственно верного решения [illegible] в Советском Союзе.

Хочу заверить Правительство США, что я отдам все свои силы и знания Правительству и Народу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

4 февраля 1964 г. Носенко

14-00000

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

14-00000

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1
(L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public

(SEAL)

My commission expires September 24, 1969

14-00000

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April, 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN I

Dear IDEN I

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

SECRET

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

SECRET

c. (1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

14-00000

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1

Date: March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2

Date: 6 March 1970

14-00000

25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

14-00000

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 — May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek — Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 — 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 — 17 May 74
Date

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14-00000

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold F. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci	22 Jan 75
	Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

Defector

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Neil

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T   EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM:
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUN 1975			
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie				3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain				
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~				This requires editing before passing to the DCI.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 3-62 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL

[illegible]

?? JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

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in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

14-00000

SECRET

75-2244

Executive Registry
75-6942

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

cc - DCI
cc - IG
cc - OGC

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SECRET

14-00000

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Attn: C Mardirosian SE/DDO
Dist Staff 3 C/SE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

IG 75-0335

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

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Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

Reel No. 1, 11 June 1962 (The quality of the tape is very poor.)

Translated from Russian by P. D.

(N. talks about surveillance of Soviet personnel in the United States.)

Nosenko: Let me tell you - I (---) I was also in the States, although under another name. I had a certain business there . . .

O. This was (?) in Washington (?)?

Nosenko: Yes, I was there.

Q: On TDY?

Nosenko: 19 days, 19 days only.

Q: Under what name?

Nosenko: NIKOLAYEV.

Q: NIKOLAYEV?

Nosenko: In England I was NIKOLAYEV and in your country I was NIKOLAYEV.

Q: ---first and middle name?

Nosenko: Yes, Yuriy, Yuriy, also Yuriy.

Q: And in England you also were for a short time?

Nosenko: In England I was for ten and fifteen days . . .

Note: During the interrogation of Nosenko in 1964, he denied that he ever said that he was in the United States.

2. You stated previously that while traveling to England and Cuba, you were documented as Nikolayev. Under what cover did you travel to those countries? What was your Legend-Biography?

Note: Any KGB officer going abroad under another name and under cover prepares a Legend-Biography to cover up his real identity. If Nosenko travelled as Nikolayev, then his legend omitted "the fact" that he was a son of a Minister because there was no Minister of Shipbuilding Industry with the name of Nikolayev, etc., etc.)

3. You stated previously that in January 1960 you were processed to go to the US with the Soviet Automotive Delegation. You obtained a passport in your true name, Nosenko, but the date was postponed, then cancelled. Who selected your candidacy for the trip? What were you supposed to do in the USA? Why was the trip postponed? Why were you processed in your true name, Nosenko, and not under the name Nikolayev, under which you visited England or [illegible]?

4. In 1962 you stated that while working with the KGB, you personally recruited ten Americans. Please give us their names and how you recruited them.

Note: Nosenko was asked why he was chosen to go to Geneva in 1962 instead of an officer from the Department (KGB) Delegation. Answering this question he mentioned the recruitment of ten Americans.

Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

11 June 1962

Nosenko: Gribanov, the chief of the whole counterintelligence. (His name) Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov . . . so, Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov decided you go, that I must be here (in Geneva). I said, "Be my guest, Oleg Mikhaylovich. I am not saying no. . ." So Gribanov decided "You will go. That's all" (Nosenko knocked on the desk). . . Well, what am I? . . . Who have I recruitted? . . . Ten Americans, no more than that . . . (and Gribanov said) "You will go! You must go!"

III. Soviet visas and other regulations for tourists traveling to the USSR.

✓ 1. Didn't you know or remember how Oswald's visa was processed and from what country Oswald entered the USSR? Is it possible that he entered the USSR on a "podvisnaya" visa?

✓ 2. You previously said that you saw Oswald's visa application, but you could not say from what country Oswald came to the USSR. In your opinion, is it possible that Oswald received his visa application in some other European country, then went to Finland and through Finland entered the USSR without contacting the Soviet consulate in Helsinki? Did you hear any talk about the possibility that is described above? If so, when did you hear it and from whom?

✓ 3. On 3 July 1964 you stated that you have seen Oswald's anketa (visa application). Do you remember what was in that anketa? Did you read the anketa? What did you mean that you saw the anketa? Was it in the name Lee Harvey Oswald, or was there another name? Did you see the name of the person who signed the anketa?

4. Do you have any information to the effect that Oswald might not have come to the Soviet consulate or to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki to obtain his visa? Could he have obtained a visa in Switzerland or Sweden then have come to Helsinki and, without reporting to the Soviet consulate in Helsinki, have taken a train to Leningrad and then to Moscow?

5. According to your previous information, "any tourist - he buys a tour to the Soviet Union, makes out the anketa, and then comes to Moscow." In what country did Oswald buy a tour to the USSR? In what country did Oswald fill in the anketa? If the anketa goes to Moscow, to what office in Moscow does it go? To MID, KGB? Is it possible that all the data on Oswald from his anketa was sent to Moscow by a cable? Did you see and read Oswald's anketa or a telegram that Oswald is coming to Moscow? If you did not read the anketa, who among the KGB officers of the Second Chief Directorate or the First Chief Directorate read the anketa or had access to it? Who would logically have access to the anketa?

6. According to your previous information, any person who wants to visit the USSR has to buy a tour in a foreign tourist firm in his home country or any other country, and the tourist firm will make arrangements for his stay in the USSR. It is understood that he must fill in the anketa, and in addition to the general questions, the common tourist should make requests for the cities he intends to visit and for the accommodations he wants. The tourist would know in advance when he receives his visa his date of arrival in Moscow, in what hotel he is going to stay, and what kind of accommodations he would be given. The question, then, is do you know when Intourist received Oswald's request and application and when it answered him that his demands are met and that he is welcome in Moscow?

7. From your knowledge, when Oswald arrived in Moscow, was he handled by the Intourist Agency or by Sputnik, the Youth Tourist Bureau of the USSR, or by the Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions?

Note: The Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions organizes exchanges of tourists between trade unions of the USSR and other countries. Sputnik was organized in June 1958 for the exchange of of tourists (students and other youths).

8. What is the procedure after a tourist applies for a Soviet visa? Do you know at what tourist agency or in what foreign country Oswald applied for a visa to the USSR or bought a tour to the USSR? Who was the Soviet Intourist representative in that country who took Oswald's visa application to the Soviet Embassy?

✓ 9. You stated previously that Oswald was not considered a defector. If he was not a defector, then what was he?

<u>Note:</u> If the KGB did not consider Oswald to be a defector, then it is possible that Oswald was known to the KGB long before his arrival in the USSR as a tourist and Oswald was assured that when he arrived in the USSR he would be given Soviet citizenship or at least a permanent residence permit. Although he would be a defector anyway, it could be that Oswald did not like the word defector and the KGB decided not to call him a defector but, let us say, a volunteer. The Soviet Constitution states that the USSR grants the right of asylum to all foreign citizens "who are persecuted for safeguarding the interests of the working class or who are persecuted for scientific activities, for national-liberation struggle." (Article 129 of the USSR Constitution of 1936.)

✓ 10. You stated previously that "since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador can give a visa in three to five days. If so, what was so special for the Soviet government that the ambassador would be personally involved in issuing a visa to Oswald?

<u>Note:</u> It is known that in 1957 the Soviet government adopted some measures to improve travel for foreign tourists in the USSR. They mostly concerned currency exchange. The 1957 regulations said nothing about visas. Nosenko should be questioned about the 1957 decision of the Soviet government to determine if he is not mistaking the 1957 decision with that of 1960.

✓ 11. You stated previously that since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador can give visas in from three to five days. The available information published by the Soviets unmistakenly states that a visa cannot be obtained in less than seven days (in some cases it takes five to seven days). Following are excerpts from a book entitled <u>Moscow, A Tourists Companion,</u> published in Moscow in 1969, and from the magazine <u>Soviet Life,</u> May 1978, p. 59. <u>Soviet Life</u> stated that "visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of application at a Soviet consulate."

Formalities

All you need for [illegible] trip to the Soviet Union is your national passport and [illegible] indicating the time of your visit and the itinerary.

Visa. As a rule, visas are obtained for travellers by tourist firms and travel agen[illegible]. [illegible] you can get your visa yourself. Visas are issued by S[illegible] consular offices in every country five to seven days aft[illegible]. The visa is valid for the indicated time of [illegible] points of entry and exit on the Soviet border [illegible] depending on your route.

If you decide to extend your visit or alter the itinerary, apply to the service bureau at your hotel. If Intourist is able to provide the necessary accommodation, your visa will be altered accordingly. Visas, and subsequent alterations in them, are free of charge.

Visas for transit travel via the U.S.S.R. by railway or motor are issued if you have the pertinent visa of the country neighbouring on the U.S.S.R. You need no Soviet visa if you travel

via U.S.S.R. by air, provided you do not stay in Soviet transfer towns for more than 24 hours.

Intourist does not service travellers who come on visits to relatives in the Soviet Union. Neither does it offer services in towns where Intourist agencies are unavailable. In such cases, apply to a Soviet consulate abroad.

Under reciprocal agreements between the Soviet Union and some other countries, no visas are necessary for nationals of these countries for travel in the U.S.S.R. and for Soviet tourists visiting these countries.

Medical Formalities. An international smallpox inoculation certificate is required for entry to the Soviet Union from African, Asian and South American countries, and, in addition, a cholera certificate for entry from India and Eastern Pakistan.

Customs. Personal belongings—garments, shoes, tourist and sports gear, perfumery and cosmetics, etc. in quantities necessary for the time of stay in the Soviet Union depending on the season, are duty-free. Besides, travellers may bring duty-free (per person) two cameras, one amateur cine-camera and a reasonable (non-commercial) amount of souvenirs. Persons coming to the Soviet Union on a hunting tour (provided they have a certificate issued by Intourist or a foreign travel firm confirming this purpose of their trip) may bring sporting rifles.

To make sure passage home is unhindered, please register the foreign currency you have brought with you with the customs, which will issue you a pertinent certificate.

It is prohibited to bring to the U.S.S.R. Soviet currency, Soviet government bonds, annulled securities, arms, opium and hashish and appliances for smoking them, obscene [illegible] and books, films, records, etc., politically and economically prejudicious to the U.S.S.R.

All objects and articles (except those prohib[illegible] law) may be shipped out of the U.S.S.R. in any quant[illegible] provided they have been purchased with Soviet money [illegible] [illegible] at the Vneshtorg Bank of the U.S.S.R. or the oth[illegible] [illegible] agencies of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. (Gosbank) an[illegible] purchased with foreign convertible currency. For the unhinder[illegible] passage of such goods make sure you have the pertinent bank certificates or shop's bills.

It is prohibited to ship out of the USSR arms and so-called securities. Antiques and ... art may be shipped out provided you obtain ... from the Ministry of Culture and have paid ... duty amounting to 100 per cent of the price ...
Detailed ... in the *Tourist's Memo* ...
Foreign Exchange ... available at all border points ... and most hotels. Service bureaus at hotels will ... address and office hours of money-changing offices ...
Rules for Photographers and Cine-camera Fans. It is a rare tourist who forgoes the pleasures of photography in a foreign country.
In the Soviet Union you may photograph everything, and everywhere, save objects coming under the head of the nation's defence. This applies to all types of military technology, seaports, major hydrotechnical objects, railway junctions, tunnels, railway bridges, industrial enterprises, and the like. Aerial photography and terrestrial panoramic photography, and photography within 25 kilometres from the frontier are prohibited. Ask for permission of the administration before you use your camera inside factories, research institutes, and the like. It stands to reason, too, that when you ... you must first obtain their consent.
If you intend to make a film for commercial purposes (for subsequent showing at cinemas, television, etc.) apply to Sovexportfilm (7, Maly ...kovsky Pereulok, Moscow), tel. 229-32-02. Bear in mind ... sensitive colour materials (films, paper, etc.) on sale in the Soviet Union are adapted solely for Agfa and ...
Intourist Se...
Every hotel ... elsewhere in the Soviet Union) has an Intourist ... It is very useful to tourists and we advise you ... it on arrival. The service bureaus are staffed with people who speak foreign languages and you will have no difficulty communicating with them.
One of their major functions is to exchange the vouchers issued to you by your travel agent for Intourist coupons, and to provide all other services.

The service bureau will relieve you of all travel cares and book tickets for you on internal and international railway and airlines. It will help you extend your visa and perform all other pertinent formalities.
The service bureau books tickets to theatres, concerts, cinemas and sports contests. Make sure that you book tickets well in advance, for every Muscovite is an avid theatre-goer and sports-fan and tickets are scarce.
The price of a theatre and concert ticket is 2 to 3.50 rubles, and of a cinema ticket 40 to 70 kopeks.
The service bureau will tell you what is showing at Moscow's theatres, concert halls and cinemas.
If your tour does not cover excursions and you wish to see the sights of Moscow, the service bureau will be glad to recommend the best sightseeing itineraries.
If you need a guide-interpreter, the service bureau will be happy to provide one. Intourist guides speak English, Bulgarian, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Hungarian, German, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian, Finnish, French, Czech, Swedish and Japanese. The services of a guide-interpreter cost up to 3 hours—... rubles, for every subsequent hour—1 ruble 50 kopeks.
You can hire a car for a sightseeing tour of Moscow and its environs or order a long-distance telephone call through the service bureau.
If you are unwell, the service bureau will summon a doctor ... you. As you know, medical services in the Soviet Union are ... of charge.
Approach your hotel service bureau with anything that ... interest or trouble you. The receptionist will be glad ... advise you and to render all the necessary assistance.

If You Are Passing Through Moscow

If you are passing through Moscow and have only a day ... is what we recommend you to see:
1. *Excursion by car or tourist coach.* A three-hour tour which will give you a general idea of old and new Moscow. The ... starts from Hotel National in the heart of the city and ...

the Maurice Thorez Embankment (formerly Sophiskaya), Red Square, Sverdlov Square, along Gorky Street, Sadovoye Koltso, Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Leninsky Prospekt, past Moscow University on the Lenin Hills back to the National.

2 *Tour of the Kremlin and Red Square.* A visit to the Kremlin cathedrals and the Armoury. The tour takes three hours.

If you have another day in Moscow, be sure to visit the *Exhibition of Economic Achievement of the U.S.S.R.* (see p. 60), which will give you a good idea of contemporary Soviet life and the cultural and economic achievements of Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Union. The excursion takes four hours. In the afternoon, pay a visit to the famous *Tretyakov Art Gallery* (see p. 150), the treasure trove of Russian fine art. The excursion there takes something like three hours.

Do your best, too, to see Moscow's glorious *Bolshoi Theatre ballet.*

If you have a few more days in Moscow, pick tours to suit your taste and inclinations.

Continue Your Trip

From Moscow you can make a tour of the Soviet Union—the subtropics of the Black Sea coast and the Siberian taiga, the Ukrainian steppelands, the mountains of the Caucasus, and the ancient towns of Russia and Central Asia.

Here is the list of cities where Intourist offers its services:

…ingrad, cradle of the Russian revolution, a city of magnificent architecture;

…*k Sea health resorts* of Batumi, Odessa, Sochi, Sukhumi and Yalta;

…*rian and Far Eastern cities:*

…sibirsk—the largest industrial centre and city of science in …stern Siberia;

…tsk, a new Siberian town neighbouring on the Bratsk Hydro-… Station on the Angara, which is one of the world's …gest

…kutsk, the city near the legendary Lake Baikal;

…barovsk, a major Soviet Far Eastern city.

Additional information on Visas

QUESTION: I would like to see an article about Intourist services, prices, etc. (C. C. Krause, Minneapolis, Minnesota; M. Suparoff, Foxboro, Massachusetts; and many other readers)

ANSWER: Intourist is our state-operated commercial travel agency. It works with some 700 firms and transport companies in nearly 100 countries, including about 100 in the United States. Intourist arranges tours for Soviet citizens abroad and for foreigners in the Soviet Union. We estimate that 25 million foreign travelers will visit our country between 1976 and 1980 and that 18 million Soviet people will go abroad.

We will deal here only with Intourist services for foreign travelers. They include sightseeing excursions, trips to museums and theaters, meetings with Soviet workers at factories and farms and with Soviet students, round table discussions and other affairs.

Intourist offers almost 20 different kinds of group or individual tours—motoring, [illegible] hunting, fishing, international competitions, [illegible] congresses and symposiums, excursions for schoolchildren and youth, cruises, art festivals and more.

Many visitors come for rest and medical treatment at spas in the North Caucasus (Essentuki, Zheleznovodsk, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk) or on the Black Sea (Sochi, Yalta, Odessa). Such a tour includes a room at a sanatorium, special diet meals, medical care and other services.

A new tour called the Russian Language Seminar is rapidly gaining popularity. Besides seeing the country, the traveler has a chance to brush up on Russian with special courses.

Cost depends on the class and type of the tour, distance, season and number of services. Intourist offers a discount on off season tours, frequently as low as one-fourth of the full price. There are special cut rates for youth and student groups, as well as for children.

Entry visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of applications at a Soviet Consulate. Foreign currency formalities are limited to declaring your currency at customs. Intourist also accepts credit cards from foreign banks and firms.

Itineraries include 135 cities of the country and are designed to suit all tastes. You can choose a separate republic or the whole country, the Caucasus, Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, the leading cultural centers, health resorts or ancient [illegible] sites.

For instance, General [illegible], one of Intourist's major U.S. partners, offers the following tours:

1) "Spotlight on Russia and the Crimea"—16 days, Moscow—Kiev—Yalta—Leningrad, price 999 to 1,423 dollars, depending on the city of departure by air to the Soviet Union and on the season. (The cost includes air fare, hotel accommodations—much cheaper for two than for one—three meals a day and guide services.)

2) "Destination Black Sea and Caucasus"—16 days, Leningrad—Sochi—Tbilisi—Yerevan—Moscow, 1,159 to 1,458 dollars.

The American Express Company, another major Intourist partner, offers a 22-day "The Complete USSR" tour through Moscow, Bratsk, Irkutsk, Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand, Baku and Leningrad, for 1,879 to 2,085 dollars.

Incidentally, if you do plan to come, for more details get in touch with the Intourist office:

Vitaliy Kozyrev, Intourist Travel Information, 40 East Forty-ninth Street, New York, New York, 10017. Telephone: (212) 371-6953.

Soviet Life, May 1975, p. 59

12. Some questions about visas could be put to Nosenko based on information provided in the book, Your Trip to the USSR (A Tourists Manual). The book is published by Foreign Languages Publication House, Moscow. Although there is no date of publication in this book, the information provided in the book strongly suggests that it was published no later than 1962. The information states that "it should not take more than a week to receive one's visa." The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (sample enclosed) and enclose three photographs of passport size as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.

APPLICATION FORM

For Persons Who Wish to Obtain an Entry Visa [illegible] the U.S.S.R. or a Transit Visa Through the U.S.S.R.
(Write clearly in ink or type all answers in full)

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
1. Surname, name and patronymic (persons who have more than one surname, or who have pen names, must list them in full; married women and widows must give their maiden name and their husband's surname)	
2. Date and place of birth	
3. Nationality	
4. Citizenship. If you were formerly a citizen or subject of another country, indicate former citizenship	
[illegible]ace [illegible] present [illegible] [illegible]sition and profess[illegible]	

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6. Reason for [illegible] to the U.S.S.R., duration of [illegible] and itinerary Note Persons [illegible] for a transit visa through the U.S.S.R. must have an [illegible] transit visa of the [illegible] which or through [illegible] upon leav[illegible] S.S.R.	
7. If minors under 16 years of age are accompanying you, indicate the surname, name and patronymic of each child	
8. Were [illegible] the U.S.S.R. before? (If so, indicate when, where and purpose of stay)	
9. Surnames, names, patronymics and addresses of close relatives in the U.S.S.R.	
10. Your [illegible]	

Date


(day, month, year)

Signature

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DOCUMENTS

Visas



To enter and leave the U.S.S.R., a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and Soviet entry and exit visas. It should not take more than a week to receive one's visa.

Citizens of foreign countries are issued Soviet visas through Consulates of the U.S.S.R. in their own country. The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (see sample) and enclose three photographs of passport size, as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet Consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.

Citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the Czechoslovak Republic have the right, according to a reciprocal agreement, to enter and leave the Soviet Union without applying for Soviet visas, on the basis of their national passports alone.

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A person's national passport should not expire [illegible] the date of his departure from the U.S.S.R.

A Soviet tourist visa is valid for entry into the U.S.S.R. and exit during the time specified and is valid [illegible] the cities enumerated in the visa. A tourist [illegible] in and leaves the U.S.S.R. only through the border points indicated in his Soviet visa.

Should your plans change unexpectedly, your visa may be extended, the itinerary altered and the border entry and exit points changed without any additional formalities if Intourist is able to provide accommodations and transportation to comply with the change. In all events, you must notify Intourist of a change in plans a few days ahead.

Visitors' visas for visiting relatives in the U.S.S.R. are granted through the usual channels.

Group visas may be issued to tourists on cruises and to large tourist groups travelling together.

Visas are issued, extended, and itineraries and border-points of entry and exit are altered free of charge.

Transit Visas

Soviet transit visas are issued within three days of [illegible] by Soviet Embassies [illegible] Consulates. No Soviet transit visas are necessary for persons of any nationality flying over the territory of the U.S.S.R., on condition that all reservations (of no longer than 24 hours' stay in any given point of change) have been

made for him along the entire route through the U.S.S.R. and that the passenger has the right to enter the next contiguous country.

Health Certificates

Tourists from Africa, South America and Asia must have an International Vaccination Certificate, and tourists from India and Eastern Pakistan must have a certificate stating that they have been inoculated against cholera. Tourists from other countries do not need to present any health certificates and there will be no medical examination. However U.S.S.R. Public Health officers [illegible] proof of health from tourists arriving from countries known to have an epidemic at the time of arrival.

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13. It would be useful to ask Nosenko his comments on the information on "Passports and Other Formalities" taken from the book, A Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union, by Viktor Louis and his wife Jennifer Louis. The book was published in Moscow in 1967.

Note: Viktor Louis and his wife are "slightly" known to Nosenko.

hand-embroidered shirt or blouse (15 roubles upwards); toys; gramophone records (12 in. LP--1 rouble); books (comparatively inexpensive); traditional silver- gilt-and-enamel ware (e.g. tiny fork for lemon or butterballs—1 rouble child's spoon with animal handle--3 roubles); wood, alabaster or pottery ornaments.

If you would like to visit the markets, you should go as early as possible in the day. You will be able to find in the market good quality fresh fruit which is often lacking in the hotels. Also on sale there are honey, fresh eggs and dairy products; there may be various items of local handwork as well. The markets close at 5·00 p.m.

PASSPORTS AND OTHER FORMALITIES

In order to enter and leave the Soviet Union a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and a Soviet entry visa. Soviet visas are issued free of charge usually within a seven-day period from the time of application to the Soviet Embassy or Consulate in the tourist's own country. The border points through which the tourist enters and leaves the Soviet Union must be those indicated in the Soviet visa.

Foreign tourists' arrivals in the Soviet Union are registered when they first hand over their passports at the first Intourist service point indicated on the visa.

In addition to Soviet visas, it is required that the citizens of most Western European countries obtain visas for the Communist countries through which they will drive on their way to and from the Soviet Union: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria; East German visas are obtainable on entry to that country.

Besides an International Driving Permit, motorists must bring an international automobile registration certificate of the country of departure, stipulated in the 1926 International Automobile Traffic Convention. Tourists' cars can be brought into the Soviet Union and taken out again without payment of duty on condition that the owner gives a written guarantee to take the car out of the country upon departure. This guarantee is to be handed over to the customs authorities at the Soviet border.

It is forbidden to bring the following into the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

(b) printed matter, films, photographs, negatives, drawings, etc. "which are hostile to the U.S.S.R. in political or economic respects".

Printed matter, plants (fruit, seeds, etc.) and animals are liable to inspection by customs authorities.

It is forbidden to take out of the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

IV. Belorussian KGB and MVD.

1. It would be useful to question Nosenko about his knowledge of the chiefs of the KGB and the MVD in the Belorussian Republic. A list of names follows:

KGB and MVD Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the Belorussian SSSR.

Chiefs

Lt. General Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava - NKVD, MGB (State Security) 1941-1953.

Maj. General Mikhail Ivanovich Baskakov - MVD 1952-1954.

Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - KGB (State Security) 1954-1959.

----------- Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - MVD 1960-1965.

Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1973.

Lt. General Yakov Prokopyevich Nikulkin - KGB (State Security) 1973-

Deputies

Maj. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - MVD 1952-1954

------------ Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak - KGB (State Security) 1959-

------------ Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1960.

Maj. General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy - KGB (State Security) 1962-

------------ Ivan Leopoldovich Lysakovskiy - KGB (State Security) 1971-

2. What do you know about Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov?

Note: (a) Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia from 1959 to 1960. It is assumed that when Oswald arrived in Minsk in January 1960, Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of of the KGB and would definitely know about the Oswald case. From 1960 to 1965, Aksenov was MVD Minister of Belorussia. Therefore it would be under his direction that Oswald's passport and the departure of Oswald and Marina from Minsk was arranged. If Nosenko had access to Oswald's file, he must know about Aksenov. From 1965 to 1971, Aksenov was First Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom of CP Belorussia, and since 1971, Aksenov has been Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian CP. He has been a member of the CC CPSU since 1976, and he is also a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. On May 9, 1978, Aksenov arrived in Columbia. He headed the Soviet delegation on the invitation of the Columbian Communist Party.

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(b) A. N. Aksenov is no doubt identical with a Colonel Nikolay Aksenov with whom, according to Epstein's book, (page 146) Marina Oswald had an interview in 1961. Aksenov is also mentioned in McMillan's book (pages 132-133). Aksenov allegedly said to Marina, "Tell your husband not to worry. I believe your request will be granted." Also see page 125 of the same book.

3. Did you know or know of Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak?

Note: Rudak was Deputy Chairman of the KGB during 1959 to 1960 and might have taken part in the Oswald case while Oswald lived in Minsk.

4. Did you know or know of Major General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy?

Note: Smorodinskiy was Deputy Chairman of the KGB for Belorussia in 1962 and most likely know about the Oswald case. His name would most likely appear in the Oswald file.

5. Do you know Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov?

Note: Petrov was KGB Chairman for Belorussia from 1959 to 1973. Therefore, it would be his agency, the KGB, which would watch Oswald in Minsk. It is safe to assume that after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Petrov, as Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia, would review the Oswald file and send it to Moscow. He would also have been called to Moscow KGB headquarters to take part in the preparation of the spravka (summary) of the Oswald file.

6. What do you know about Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn?

Note: Perepelitsyn was Chairman of the KGB of the Belorussian Republic from 1954 to 1959. Nosenko should know him or at least about him. Nosenko should be asked if Perepelitsyn took any part in the investigation of Oswald. (Perepelitsyn was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR from 1959 to 1967. He died in Moscow.)

7. What part, if any, was played by General Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov in the Oswald case, especially after the assassination of President Kennedy?

Note: Bannikov was mentioned by Nosenko as one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and later on as one of the Deputy Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR. From 1968 to 1978, Bannikov was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court.

V. Nosenko - Nikolayev

1. Can you explain why you went to England and Cuba under the name Nikolayev and to Geneva using your true name, Nosenko? What would have happened if some Englishman or English intelligence officer had met you in Geneva in 1962 or in 1964 and greeted you in the presence of the other delegates

with the words, "Oh, Mr. Nikolayev! How are you? I remember you. You visited England with the team of boxers."

VI GRU (Military Intelligence)

1. From where did you learn that the GRU was not informed about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Wouldn't the GRU officer in Intourist, whom you mentioned earlier, have known about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Did you ever hear that Oswald possibly had contact with the Soviet intelligence during his service in Japan?

2. You stated previously that there was no information that Oswald offered to give information on the US Marine Corps. You did not read the file. Then how do you know this to be the case? How do you know that the KGB and GRU made no attempt to debrief Oswald about his service in the US Marine Corps?

3. Previously you mentioned one Colonel Voloshin as an officer of the Defense Ministry of the USSR. Can you provide any additional information on this Voloshin? Could it be possible that he was a KGB officer instead of in the Defense Ministry?

Note: (a) According to Epstein's book, one Pavel T. Voloshin was an administrator at Patrice Lumumba University and was a KGB officer who accompanied a group of Russian dancers to Los Angeles in 1959 at just about the same time that Oswald was making weekend trips there to get his passport and possibly to make other arrangements for his trip to Moscow. A few weeks after Oswald decided to return to the United States, he received a letter from Patrice Lumumba University signed by Voloshin. (page 111)
(b) P. D. knew one KGB officer by the name of Voloshin (first and middle name forgotten) who used to work in SMERSH (military CI) and later in the late 1940's and beginning of the 1950's in S & T Department of the KGB.

VII. Marina.

1. From where did you pick up the information that Marina was a "simple obyvatel" (a politically unaware person) and that she was not anti-Soviet if you did not read the Oswald file?

2. You stated previously that Marina was an obyvatel. Do you have any comments on the following: "We knew each time you had a date. We knew when you applied for your marriage license. We knew the date of your wedding." These were the words of the Komsomol secretary in Minsk when Marina was expelled from the Komsomol.

3. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement when she said, "Our government (Soviet) knows every move I make." She make this comment shortly after her expulsion from the Komsomol.

4. Did you know that while in Minsk Marina belonged to a group of youths who gathered together to listen to Voice of America and BBC? Would that be enough for the KGB to have Marina in its card files? Is it possible that Marina was the KGB agent reporting on them?

5. You stated that if Marina had been recruited by the KGB, you would know about it and it would be in the file. But you did not read the file. How then do you know that she was not recruited?

6. You said that among Marina's relatives there was an officer of the Minsk Militia, a Lt. Colonel. Do you have any comments on Marina's revelation that her real father was a traitor and that he was shot? If her father was a traitor and he was shot, would his name be in the KGB card file? Would the name of Marina's mother be in the KGB card file as the wife of a traitor? Is it then possible that Marina's name also would be in the KGB card file somewhere?

7. You stated previously that KGB had no interest in Marina prior to her meeting Oswald and that the KGB investigated her only after Oswald applied for permission to register marriage with Marina. How do you know that? Did you read a special file on Marina? Marina revealed lately that while she was living in Leningrad in 1958 or 1959, she met a diplomat from Afghanistan who lured her to his hotel room and tried to make love to her. Do you think the KGB in Leningrad would know about this diplomat and whom he lured to his hotel? Is it possible that

Marina was already a KGB agent and she was directed to lure the diplomat to the hotel? In either case, the KGB would definitely know about Marina and if she was used by the KGB as a bait for foreigners, might she have already been an experienced KGB agent?

8. You stated previously that you saw Oswald's file only briefly and you read only a summary. Then how would you know that Marina ~~was~~ never used by the KGB? Did you personally make a direct check on whether or not Marina was a KGB informant?

9. In your previous testimony, you categorically denied that Marina was a KGB-MVD agent or informer. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement to Life Magazine that she was a "Soviet agent"? Is there any possibility that the KGB or MVD in Belorussia or in Leningrad, where Marina had lived previously, had recruitted her as an agent or informer and she continued to work for the KGB or the MVD until her departure to the US? Did you have any information about the possibility that there was another file in the KGB on Marina, a file for an agent or informer of the KGB or MVD? If such a file existed, it must be reflected in the Oswald file, as well as in the summary which you read.

10. Did you hear or know that while in Leningrad Marina dated one Oleg Tarussin, a student who had ambitions to enter the Soviet diplomatic service and who had some trouble with the authorities over a minor political incident?

11. Was there any information in Oswald's file to show that after Oswald married Marina, Marina was in the hospital for about five days?

12. What do you know about Marina's vacation in Kharkov shortly after she married Oswald?

Note: She may have been in Moscow instead of Kharkov.

13. Did you know that while in Minsk Oswald was in the Fourth Clinical Hospital for surgery on his adenoids? (Oswald got special attention from the doctors.)

Note: Marina's Aunt Valya, whose husband was an MVD Colonel, sent eggs to Oswald while he was in the hospital.

14. You previously stated that the reason that there were no difficulties in in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union was because Oswald was already living and working in the Soviet Union. How would the KGB have reacted to Oswald's marriage if they had known that Oswald wrote a letter to the American Embassy before his marriage about his desire to return to the United States?

15. Did you know that Oswald asked the American Embassy for permission to return to the United States before he married Marina?

VIII. Nosenko and Oswald case file.

✓ 1. Describe in detail your personal involvement with Oswald and with the Oswald case from the day Oswald arrived in the USSR to the day of his departure from the USSR. What positions in the KGB did you personally hold at that time?

✓ 2. Describe in detail your personal involvement with the Oswald case after the assassination of President Kennedy from 23 November 1963 to the day of your defection to the US.

3. In what activities were you involved in connection with the Oswald case and the assassination of President Kennedy while you were in Geneva at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964? Name any Soviet diplomats or officers of Soviet intelligence (KGB, GRU) with whom you discussed the Oswald case and the death of the American President in Geneva.

4. Are you sure that there was no file on Oswald in the KGB before he arrived in the USSR? How do you know this? Did you personally check it?

5. You previously told American authorities that on the cover of Oswald's file "there definitely was a '<u>klichka</u>'." But you said you did not remember the <u>klichka</u>. Do you remember whether the <u>klichka</u> was one word or two. As you did not read the file, is it possible that it was an old file, opened a few years previously by the First Chief Directorate or by the GRU?

6. You stated previously that nobody from the KGB had an interest in Oswald, but Oswald admitted that he had been interviewed by officials of the MVD (or KGB) at least twice on his arrival in the USSR and again before his departure. What was said about these interviews in the Oswald file or in the summary (spravka) of Oswald's file? Do you know the names of the people who talked to Oswald? Was it the KGB, MVD, or both?

7. What do you know about the "Intourist guide" Rosa Agafonova who visited Oswald in his hotel room shortly after his arrival in Moscow?

8. Did you personally know Rimma Shirokova, the Intourist guide or interpreter? Was she a KGB officer or KGB agent working for Intourist? Was there a report in the Oswald file that Rimma Shirokova sent two postcards to Oswald in Minsk from some vacation places in the south of the USSR? Did you know that Rimma Shirokova visited Oswald in Minsk? (See Epstein's book, page 124.)

<u>Note</u>: Oswald and Shirokova allegedly talked about the possibility of Oswald studying at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. It also should be noted that Shirokova visited Minsk shortly after Oswald and his wife Marina decided to go to the United States.

9. How did you know that Officer Krupnov wrote a request and opened a case file on Oswald? Did you see when Krupnov was writing it? Did you read the request or hear about it from somebody? If you saw it, who approved and sanctioned the request? If the KGB had no interest in Oswald, then why was a file opened?

10. Previously, on many occasions, you stated that the KGB had no interest in Oswald, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country. Who among the KGB junior and senior officers made the decision that the KGB had no interest in Oswald and that he should leave the country? Describe in detail how you learned about it, from whom, from what documents, and when.

11. How did you know that there was no microphone in the Hotel Berlin room where Oswald stayed? Did you personally check the room before Oswald arrived?

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12. You stated that no KGB officer was ever in contact with Oswald. How could you make such a statement if you did not read the file? You were not responsible for it, and, according to your information, you did not visit Minsk to study the Oswald case.

Note: Oswald's diary clearly shows that most of the students he met were most likely not students at all. They were more likely KGB officers under cover as students.

13. You stated previously that it was Officer Krupnov who wrote a request and opened the case file on Oswald, which was later sent to Minsk. Name other officers who participated in making the decision to open the file, who handled the file, and who sent the file to Minsk. What part did you personally play in Oswald's case while Oswald was in Moscow?

14. You stated previously that the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was not interest in Oswald because it was concerned only "with internal matters." Isn't it true that the Second Chief Directorate is the internal counterintelligence organization and is responsible for foreigners who enter the Soviet Union for any reason? Isn't it true that the tourist department of the Second Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign tourists such as Oswald? Then why wasn't the Second Chief Directorate interested in Oswald? Do you see any contradictions in your statement?

✓ 15. You stated that there was no attempt made to exploit Oswald for propaganda purposes, such as Radio Moscow broadcasts, TV, lectures, etc. How do you know this? Do you have any comments on the following: "On October 19 (1960), Lee (Oswald) was interviewed in his room at the Hotel Berlin by a correspondent of Radio Moscow, Lev Setyayev, who was ostensibly seeking his impressions as a tourist to use in propaganda broadcasts overseas." Was there an officer in the KGB by the name of Setyayev? Was this interview organized by the KGB?

16. Do you have any information that Oswald might have been met in Leningrad by Intourist and then made all the arrangements to go to Moscow?

17. Who told Intourist that there was no KGB interest in Oswald? What is the name of the officer and his department who did so? While in Moscow, Oswald was interviewed by at least three American correspondents. Is it your opinion that the Second Chief Directorate was not interested to find out why Oswald talked to these newspapermen and who they were? Isn't that part of the KGB's responsibilities?

18. According to your statement, Oswald was not considered normal. Who determined that he was not normal? How many doctors, from what institutions, concluded that Oswald was not normal? The Second Chief Directorate and Intourist officers could not conclude that Oswald was abnormal without medical expertise.

19. If Oswald was abnormal, then why did Soviet authorities, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not inform the American Embassy about it?

<u>Note:</u> In his previous interrogation, Nosenko hesitated in answering these questions.

20. You stated previously that Oswald was in the hospital, the hospital said that Oswald was not normal, and there was no action taken to inform the American Embassy. How do you know all of this without reading the Oswald file?

21. Why do you think that the American Embassy would not have taken Oswald if he had been turned over to them? Do you know that any Soviet government office contacted the American Embassy and informed them about Oswald's presence and the suicide attempt in Moscow?

22. Was the only reason that the Soviet Government did not inform the American Embassy of Oswald's alleged suicide attempt that it was feared that he might try it again?

23. You stated that there was no psychological assessment of Oswald by the KGB nor by the hospital, and that there was no report of that nature. You did not read the file. You read only summaries. Then how could you know that there was no such report? How long was the summary--100 pages?

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24. Do you know when and by whom a stateless passport was issued to Oswald? Where was it issued? Are stateless passports usually issued by the MVD on the recommendation and approval of the KGB? What would happen if the MVD issued a stateless passport without KGB knowledge or if the KGB was against it?

25. You stated previously that the KGB considered Oswald to have retained his American citizenship while he was in the Soviet Union. Do you have any comments on the fact that after his arrival in the USSR, and after having made oral requests for Soviet citizenship, he returned to the American Embassy, denounced his US citizenship and threw out his American passport to the American Consul at the Embassy. Do you think the KGB monitored Oswald's conversations with the American Consulate officers or received reports from the American Embassy (from Soviet employees there or Soviet agents there) about Oswald's denunciation of US citizenship? Did the KGB instruct Oswald to denounce his American citizenship at the American Embassy before he would be permitted to apply for Soviet citizenship?

26. You stated that the decision to give Oswald a stipend was made by the Red Cross. Explain in detail how the Red Cross learned that Oswald arrived in the USSR. Who informed the Red Cross that there was an American who needed help? Why was it decided to give help from the Red Cross and not from the Trade Union? It is understandable that Oswald might not have had enough money to start a new life in the USSR, but he was not a poor beggar who needed to be turned to the Red Cross instead of the Trade Union. How did you find out that it was the Red Cross that made the decision? According to available information, the Red Cross does not assign money to anybody without the recommendation of some other Soviet office. Which office was it: the KGB, MVD, the Council of Ministers, Intourist, or the USSR Supreme Soviet? Who

started it first" Who made the decision on the amount to pay Oswald? Why was it decided to pay him 700 rubles a month instead of 500 or 1000? What was your salary as a KGB officer? Approximately 400 rubles a month, new money? Isn't it true that Oswald received more than you did?

27. If it was decided by the KGB officers and by Soviet doctors that Oswald was abnormal, then why was he permitted to marry a Soviet citizen?

Note: According to Soviet law, in every union republic, including Belorussia, the "marriage cannot be permitted between persons if one of them is pronounced a mental case or imbecile."

Did you have any information that the Minsk KGB reported to Moscow headquarters Oswald's intention to marry a Soviet citizen, in this case, Marina?

28. You stated previously that Oswald's file was sent to the Second Directorate of the Belorussian KGB. How do you know that it was sent specifically to the Second Directorate and not to the KGB chairman or his deputy with a special instruction?

29. What do you mean "to keep an eye on him" (Oswald)? That, according to your words, was the instruction from the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate to the Belorussian Second Directorate of the KGB.

30. You stated that there was no visible surveillance of Oswald, there was no microphone in his apartment, but you stated his mail was monitered and that there were agents around Oswald in places where he worked and lived. Explain how you learned about it. Do you know tha names of any agents who reported on Oswald? If you did not read the file on Oswald, how could you know about it?

31. Previously you stated that Oswald was handled no differently than any other American defector. ". . . The only difference was that he was not to be allowed to stay, and he was considered to be abnormal." If this was the only difference, and it is quite a big one, then why was he allowed to stay in the USSR? If Oswald was "not normal" according to the KGB officers, then this should be noted in the Oswald file which was sent to

the Belorussian KGB. Therefore, the KGB and MVD in Belorussia knew about it. Then how and why was Oswald permitted to have a shotgun which he kept in his apartment in Minsk?

✓ 32. Do you have any information that while in the USSR, especially during the year 1960-1961, Oswald might have been visiting Cuba?

<u>Note</u>: Nosenko claimed that during October-November 1960, he (Nosenko) went to Cuba with a group of STATE PLANNING COMMISSION'S METALURGISTS headed by Ivan Strigen. He stayed in Cuba for two months.

✓33. Do you have any comments on the statement made by Marina's uncle, the MVD colonel: "I thought that Alik (Oswald) had not only given up his American citizenship but had become a citizen of the USSR."

<u>Note</u>: The question is that if an MVD colonel thought or could be fooled by the KGB that Oswald was a Soviet citizen, it is possible that he really was a citizen or that the KGB spread the rumor that he was.

✓34. What do you know about Oswald's association with the Foreign Language Institute in Minsk?

✓ 35. To your knowledge, what KGB, GRU, and other intelligence schools or training courses were in Belorussia during your work with the KGB?

✓ 36. What do you know about Oswald's application to attend Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow? Why was Oswald denied entrance to the University?

<u>Note</u>: At that time, Colonel Yerzin, senior KGB officer, was a deputy director of Patrice Lumumba University. (P. D.)

37. Did you know that Oswald took with him to the American Embassy a letter from his friend Ziger in Minsk? Oswald left that letter at the American Embassy.

✓ 38. What do you know about the fact that Oswald, while in Minsk, received American magazines and other publications? Do you think the KGB knew about it?

✓ 39. Did you know that Oswald was helped to study Russian at the Minsk plant by one of his co-workers and by one of his friends, Erich, and by a girl at the Foreign Language Institute? Do you know the names of those people?

40. What do you know about Oswald's association and friendship with foreign students in the USSR in Minsk and Moscow? Do the names Mary Louise Patterson and Mrs. Roberto Camacho mean anything to you?

41. What do Oswald's files show about his contacts with Cuban students in Minsk?

Note: McMillan's book stated that Oswald began to seek out the Cuban students in Minsk, of whom there were 300 or so, to learn what he could of Castro's revolution. (See page 127.)

42. You stated previously that Oswald was a poor shot and that during his hunting trips he did not kill anything. Was this information in the summary you read? Do you have any comments on the fact that according to the Warren Commission Report and the records of Oswald's service in the Marines that he, Oswald, was a sharp shooter and marksman? Was the "fact" that Oswald was a poor shot mentioned in the summary?

43. You stated previously (27 and 29 July 1964) that you saw the file on Oswald only briefly and that the file was at the Seventh Department for only 35-40 minutes. Then how do you know that nobody in the Soviet Union, including KGB officers, ever sat down with Oswald and got all the information on Oswald? Was everything that you told to US authorities about Oswald picked up from the summary during those 35-40 minutes?

44. Describe in detail how you and other officers of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate worked together on writing the first Spravka (summary) on Oswald. You also stated that this spravka (the first one) was prepared in Moscow before the Oswald file from Minsk arrived in Moscow. What material did you use in preparing the spravka? Was there another file on Oswald in Moscow or was it a control file (Kontrolnoye delo)?

Note: In important cases the real file is in the place where the subject lives and works. In this case, the Oswald file was in Minsk. Moscow would have an almost identical file on the subject for control purposes and for instructions on how to handle and develop the case. This headquarters file is called the Control File. This file exists on the person who is already an agent or who is under development or training.

45. You stated that when the file on Oswald arrived from Minsk, you, together with other officers looked quickly through the file, then senior officers Fedoseyev and Matveyev of the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate took the file and you never saw it again. Because the file was in your department only 20-30 minutes (in other places Nosenko said 35-40 minutes), the Spravka could not be written in such a short time, and because the file was taken away to the higher authorities of the Second Chief Directorate and to the KGB chairman, you had no chance to see the second Spravka. Then again the question is which summary did you read--the second or the first or both? Describe in detail how long the summary was, what was in it, and how long it took for you to read it. Did you make any notes from the summary in case later on you had to report the "facts" to US intelligence?

46. What do you know about Oswald's visit (from Minsk) to the American Embassy in Moscow on July 8, 1961?

Note: Oswald flew from Minsk to Moscow allegedly without permission from the Soviet authority.

What do you know about Marina's visit to Moscow on July 10, 1961? What part did the KGB play in the arrangements of Marina's visit to the American Embassy in Moscow without checking her papers and without stopping her at the gates. In what hotel in Moscow did Oswald and Marina stay at that time?

✓47. You stated previously that the First Chief Directorate provided no information about Oswald before Oswald went to Mexico. What information did the First Chief Directorate give to the Second Chief Directorate before he went to Mexico? Did you read this information? If you did not personally read it, then how did you learn the contents of the First Chief Directorate information? Who from the First Chief Directorate particularly talked to the officers of the Second Chief Directorate and with whom did they talk?

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48. How did you learn what Oswald said at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City? Who told you that Oswald wanted to return to the USSR? Was this written in the summary?

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

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Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R	1133	REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C
		DATE 19 June 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. N. Shepanek ~~Mr. Dan Grace~~ SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6 Green~~				Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ________. Please respond as soon as possible.
2. ~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~OS~~ ~~Tube: FX1~~				Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks, Rodge
3. ~~Mr. Young~~ ~~OGC~~ ~~Tube: DX2 Green~~				(RE 7: CI staff says they may be shown to Blakey. [initials])
4. ~~Mr. Dick Heuringer~~ ~~OLC~~				
5. ~~Ralph Mandelveldt~~ ~~OP~~ ~~Tube: FX2~~				
6. ~~Mr. Hubbell Henry~~ ~~OL~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
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[illegible] SA/DO/O	[illegible]	19 June 76		19 June 76				
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	C. Kessler 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1D 15	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	M. Shepanek	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
ACCI (NOAA)								
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge								
DDO/TSCO 1815	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Lapenick DDO/LC	M. Lapenick	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
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T O P S E C R E T

14-00000

DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

14-00000

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	—
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case	67
	Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES :

Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

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2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seoon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

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parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

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C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

14-00000

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

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Department of Justice
Washington 20530

October 23, 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko (ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

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9 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

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There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn — 8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security — Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
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1 - ER
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1 - DDP
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Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927		Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR		
Male	Divorced	Brown	Blue/Gray	5ft. 11 inches
Soviet	Caucasian	--		

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT:	Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
AKA:	Yuri NOSSENKO
DPOB:	30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
MARITAL STATUS:	1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV). 1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced. 23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.
CHILDREN:	Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)
EDUCATION:	1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools. 1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.
EMPLOYMENT:	March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence). March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).
MILITARY:	Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.
NATIONALITY:	Soviet
PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:	1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR 1956 - Candidate Communist Party 1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

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SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational interest to this Agency. Therefore,~~ it is requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

IN CASE ADDRESS REPLY TO

AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

July 24, 1969

A13 724 817

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

e.n. 16 Jan. 1970

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downgrading and
declassification

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11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with those contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

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5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
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1 cc - C/CI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressure.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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14-00000

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post 2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Wash Post 2/15/64

folio

SECRET

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~(abc)~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

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SECRET

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

TOBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
SUPPLEMENTAL

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
	C/SRD
	C/S[illegible]3
/	C/S3
	C/ID/
	[illegible]
	A&TS

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District ~~Field Office who are concerned~~ with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
for Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times. so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/[illegible] should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANEGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)

2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)

3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

OLC 69-0675

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D. Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

---

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

SECRET EYES ONLY

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts: With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other ~~officers responsible for his safety~~ and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

SEC

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

SEC

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

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conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and

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debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was

made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception

on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral

investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an

ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major

aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

<u>Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status</u>

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were

to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,

to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what

this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,

there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

SECRET

J... ... ...
Nosenko

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of [illegible] his confine-ment, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confine-ment and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account .

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9 January 1975

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~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ SECRET

2

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected~~ to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

E?ES ONLY

13 74-0123

31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

SECRET
EYES ONLY

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

2

31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

/Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
Original - Adse
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EYES ONLY

SECRET

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

Я, [illegible], прошу Пра-
вительство США предоставить мне политическое
убежище в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Это решение мною принято в результате
длительных [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

Я отношусь к [illegible] [illegible] непри-
миримой оппозиции. Работая в КГБ и зная
то, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], о внутрен-
ней [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible]
советского правительства, я убедился, что в
СССР нет и не будет правды и человеческой свобо-
ды пока [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] комму-
нистической партии. Находясь в командировке
в странах Запада я имел [illegible] [illegible]
и [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible]
свободного мира. [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] в [illegible] и [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] для [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] и [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
в Советском Союзе.

Хочу заверить Правительство США, что я [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Правительству и народу
Соединенных Штатов Америки.

[illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]

14-00000

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1 (L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public

My commission expires September 24, 1969

(SEAL)

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

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4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income tax and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

(1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

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this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph 7 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date: ______________________

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 ______________________ Date: March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 ______________________ Date: 6 March 1970

SECRET

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25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

14-00000

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

14-00000

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

14-00000

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 — May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek — Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 — 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 — 17 May 74
Date

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CL by: 063837

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci	22 Jan 75
	Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

14-00000

Review Staff: 75/880

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2.3?

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM: Charles W. Kane, Director of Security CWK

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUN 1975		[illegible]	
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie	[illegible]		[illegible]	3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain			[illegible]	
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~ SUB [illegible]	7-1			[illegible] before passing to [illegible]
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS | SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | INTERNAL USE ONLY | UNCLASSIFIED

JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

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in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

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75-2244

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder

Walter Elder

cc - DCI
cc - IG
cc - OGC

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Review Staff: 75/880

SECRET

Mr. Regan

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Att: C Mardirosian SE/DDO
Dist St-#3 C/SE

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IG 75-[illegible]

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

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[illegible]